HCLU AND THREE PARTNER ORGANISATIONS INTERVENE IN THE POLISH PEGASUS CASE BEFORE THE ECHR

The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, together with three other human rights organisations – Data Rights France working at the EU level, the Greek organisation Homo Digitalis, and the Spanish (Catalan) organisation Irídia – has intervened in the case of Brejza v. Poland, currently before the European Court of Human Rights. These organisations are connected by the fact that they all operate in countries where the Pegasus spyware has been misused to surveil political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders. Their intervention aims to present the Court with the serious human rights consequences of spyware abuse and to assist in establishing appropriate legal standards.

Background of the Case and its Connection to the Pegasus Scandal

The Brejza case centres on the surveillance of Krzysztof Brejza, a Polish opposition politician. His phone was monitored for years using the Pegasus spyware, granting full access to his personal and political communications, which were later manipulated and used against him during the election campaign. However, the Pegasus scandal is not limited to Poland: similar cases have surfaced in Hungary, Greece, and Spain, where state authorities, citing national security, have also monitored political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders.

How Did the Interveners Assist the Court?

The intervening organisations shared their expertise with the Court in three key areas:

  1. Lack of Legal Remedies: The interveners highlighted that in surveillance cases, those affected are placed in an almost impossible situation when seeking legal redress. In Hungary, for example, victims are never notified that they have been monitored, making it practically impossible for them to prove their case in court. Moreover, courts can only act if data processing is proven – which is impossible in the case of secret surveillance.

  2. Abusive Use of National Security as a Justification: In the affected countries, authorities routinely justify surveillance on national security grounds, even when the targets pose no genuine threat. The complete lack of transparency in the process and the secrecy surrounding such operations make effective legal oversight impossible.

  3. The Effects of Spyware Go Beyond Those of Traditional Surveillance: The interveners emphasised that Pegasus and similar spyware do not merely intercept communications but grant full access to victims' devices. In some cases – as documented in India, for example – those conducting the surveillance have been able to manipulate victims’ data or even plant false evidence on their devices.

The interveners urged the Court to apply stricter standards when assessing the legality of secret surveillance with spyware and to ensure that those affected have access to effective legal remedies.

The submission can be downloaded HERE.

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